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Abstract 
 
The appeal to expert opinion is an argument form that uses the verdict of an expert to support 
a position or hypothesis. A previous scheme-based treatment of the argument form is 
formalised within a Bayesian network that is able to capture the critical aspects of the 
argument form, including the central considerations of the expert’s expertise and 
trustworthiness. We propose this as an appropriate normative framework for the argument 
form, enabling the development and testing of quantitative predictions as to how people 
evaluate this argument, suggesting that such an approach might be beneficial to 
argumentation research generally. We subsequently present two experiments as an example 
of the potential for future research in this vein, demonstrating that participants’ quantitative 
ratings of the convincingness of a proposition that has been supported with an appeal to 
expert opinion were broadly consistent with the predictions of the Bayesian model.  
 
Keywords: Psychology; Philosophy; Computer Science; Communication; Reasoning; Human 
Experimentation 
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The Appeal to Expert Opinion: Quantitative support for a Bayesian Network Approach 
 
Concepts of trust and expertise are important in human life. From an early age, we 
build our knowledge of the world and language from direct experience, but also from the 
testimonies of those in a better position to know than ourselves (e.g., our parents – see Harris 
& Corriveau, 2011, for a review of developmental research showing infants’ and children’s 
ability to differentiate between reliable and unreliable information sources). This reliance on 
testimony extends throughout adulthood – we let our doctor diagnose us; the weatherman 
forecasts for us; reviews direct us towards movies to see or books to buy; and more formally, 
witnesses (both expert and lay) influence decisions within the courtroom. We do not, 
however, blindly follow the advice or opinions of others. Central features of testimony that 
help us to determine its truth are the trustworthiness and expertise of the source, as well as 
how the testimony’s content fits with our own opinion on the matter.   
 This fundamental importance of the concepts of trust and expertise has led to 
substantial coverage across a wide variety of psychological research areas. In the current 
paper, we will define ‘trust’ and ‘expertise’ as distinct concepts, but in past research the terms 
have often been used interchangeably. In addition to developmental psychology, other 
research areas that have been interested in these concepts include: judgment and decision 
making (e.g., Birnbaum & Mellers, 1983; Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979), reasoning research 
(Stevenson & Over, 2001; Wolf, Rieger, & Knauff, 2012), and social psychological research 
into persuasion and attitude change (e.g., Briñol & Petty, 2009; Chaiken, 1980; Hovland, 
Janis, & Kelley, 1953; McGuire, 1985; O’Hara, Netemeyer, & Burton, 1991; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1981; Pornpitakpan, 2004 - also incorporating direct applied research in 
advertising, e.g., Braunsberger & Munch, 1998; Ohanian, 1991; Wiener & Mowen, 1986). 
Moreover, the concepts of trust and expertise are also of vital importance in the evaluation of 
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legal testimony, and research has concerned both formalisations of how testimony should be 
viewed (e.g., Friedman, 1987; Hahn, Oaksford, & Harris, 2012; Lagnado, Fenton & Neil, 
2013; Schum, 1981, 1994; Walton, 2008a), and descriptive studies investigating the degree to 
which people are sensitive to different relevant aspects of a witness’ testimony (e.g., Eaton & 
O’Callaghan, 2001; ForsterLee, Horowitz, Athaide-Victor, & Brown, 2000; Harris & Hahn, 
2009; Krauss & Sales, 2001; see Wells & Olson, 2003, for a review). The importance of trust 
and expertise for humans, and hence its interest for researchers in psychology, predicts its 
importance for artificial intelligence systems, and hence its interest for computer scientists. 
For example, information search systems must delineate between trustworthy and non-
trustworthy sources of information (e.g., Balakrishnan & Kambhampati, 2011; for a review of 
trust research in computer science see Artz & Gil, 2007). Concepts pertaining to trust and 
expertise are also of central interest to a research area spanning both psychology and 
computer science, as well as philosophy: namely, argumentation (e.g., Hahn, Harris & 
Corner, 2009; Hahn et al., 2012; Walton, 1997, 2008a). Here, trust and expertise are of 
particular importance in the evaluation of the appeal to expert opinion, which has long been 
recognised as a distinct argument form (see e.g., Hastings, 1962; Schellens, 1985; 
Kienpointner, 1992; and, in particular, Walton, 1997, and references therein). This argument 
form is the focus of the theoretical and empirical work presented here, providing a bridging 
point for divergent disciplines who share a mutual interest in trust and expertise research.   
  
The Appeal to Expert Opinion 
   The ‘appeal to expert opinion’ or ‘appeal to authority’ “uses the opinion of a 
respected authority or expert on a subject as a positive personal argumentation to support 
one’s own side of an argument” (Walton, 2008b, p. 209). We use the term appeal to expert 
opinion, since we follow the majority of textbook treatments (see Walton, 1997) in being 
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specifically concerned with appeals to epistemic authority (what Walton, 1997, refers to as 
cognitive authority), as opposed to what Walton (1997) terms administrative authority. 
Epistemic authority relates to the authority of those with superior knowledge in a specific 
field – experts. Administrative authority, by contrast, relates to those who have had authority 
bestowed upon them, and are thus in a position of power. For example, the police are in a 
position of administrative authority, according to the law of the land. Hence, if they inform 
you that you should drive more slowly, you should heed them because you are legally obliged 
to do so. By contrast, a medical doctor possesses epistemic authority pertaining to health 
matters. For that reason, if she were to advise me to take my medicine twice a day, I would be 
wise to comply, but not legally or morally obliged. I would likely comply because I perceive 
her to possess more knowledge than I do on the benefits of various medicine routines.
1 
 Following a thorough review of the extant literature, Walton (1997) provides a 
scheme-based treatment of the appeal to expert opinion (on argumentation schemes more 
generally see e.g., Hastings, 1962; Kienpointner, 1992; Garsson, 2001; and within computer 
science, e.g., Reed & Rowe, 2004, and Rahwan & Simari, 2009; for comprehensive overview 
of the literature on argumentation schemes see Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008).  From this 
scheme-based perspective, the appeal to expert opinion is viewed as a fallible, defeasible 
argument form, which is certainly not inherently fallacious, but can be considered stronger or 
weaker depending on the degree to which six key criteria are met (Table 1). Walton’s focus is 
on the dialectical context of the argument - that is, the wider argumentative exchange within 
which the argument is put forward.  In general, dialectical approaches to argumentation 
maintain that the evaluation of arguments must take into account the dialectical nature of 
argumentation as a structured exchange between proponents and opponents putting forward 
claims and counter-claims. In keeping with this focus,Walton presents his evaluation criteria  
as questions that an opponent in an argumentative exchange should raise to a proponent 
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putting forward an appeal to expert opinion. The strength or weakness of a particular instance 
of this argument form can then be evaluated as a function of how satisfactorily these 
questions can be answered. 
 The questions outlined in Table 1 originate from Walton’s (1997, p. 102) description 
of the argument form of the appeal to expert opinion being: 
 
 
“E [for expert] is a genuine expert in S [the subject under discussion]. 
E asserts that A. 
A is within S. 
A is consistent with what other experts say. 
A is consistent with available objective evidence (if any is known). 
Therefore, A can be accepted as a plausible presumption.” 
 
Walton thus sees the appeal to expert opinion as a type of presumptive argument: so long as 
the premises in the first five lines hold, the conclusion holds – with the qualifier that A is 
plausible (rather than certain as in logical, deductive inference). The potential for each of 
these premises to be true to some degree rather than dichotomously true or false, combined 
with the recognition that non-fallacious instances of the appeal to expert opinion can range 
from very weak to very strong make a probabilistic treatment of this argument type 
appealing. Walton (1997, p. 121) himself states, “We leave open whether it could be analyzed 
as some species of subjective probability, of the kind studied in statistics” (though see 
additional critiques of the probabilistic approach in Walton, 2008a, pp. 33, 92-102). In this 
paper we aim to describe such a probabilistic analysis. 
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Hahn et al. (2012) presented a Bayesian formalisation of the appeal to expert opinion, 
capturing its key characteristics (as identified by Walton, 1997, 2008a, 2008b, see Table 1) 
within a Bayesian network, which we describe next. As we show in this paper, such a 
formalisation allows one to move beyond the qualitative considerations of the scheme-based 
approach and to provide normative evaluation that highlights not just individual factors 
influencing argument strength, but also their interactions, and provides specific quantitative 
evaluation of the relative convincingness of individual exemplars of the  appeal to expert 
opinion. In showing how the approach can be applied to specific examples, we show also 
how it can be used to guide detailed empirical investigation of people’s actual evaluation of 
appeals to expert opinion. The two empirical studies we present show initial support for  the 
contention that people’s evaluation of this argument form are broadly consistent with the 
predictions derived from Hahn et al.’s (2012) Bayesian formalisation. In the next section, we 
briefly introduce the Bayesian approach to argumentation, before describing how Walton’s 
(1997) argumentation scheme for the appeal to expert opinion might be instantiated within a 
specific Bayesian model.     
 
The Bayesian Approach  
 Hahn and Oaksford (e.g., 2006, 2007a) put forward a Bayesian theory of informal 
argumentation. The Bayesian approach to argumentation, and to reasoning more generally, 
proposes that an individual’s degree of belief in a particular proposition, or hypothesis, can be 
represented as a subjective probability between 0 and 1 (see also e.g., Evans & Over, 2004; 
Howson & Urbach, 1996; Oaksford & Chater, 1998, 2007). Upon receiving a new piece of 
evidence – for example, a testimony from an expert source – the normative way in which this 
evidence should be integrated with one’s previous belief is given by Bayes’ rule: 
)|()()|()(
)|()(
)|(
HePHPHePHP
HePHP
eHP

  (1) 
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In Equation 1, P(H|e) represents one’s posterior degree of belief that some hypothesis is true 
given the evidence, e, which one has just received. From Equation 1, it can be seen that this is 
a function of P(H), one’s initial, prior, belief in the hypothesis (before receiving evidence) 
and the relationship between P(e|H), that is, the likelihood of receiving the evidence if the 
hypothesis is indeed true, and P(e|¬H), the likelihood of receiving the evidence if the 
hypothesis is in fact false. This relationship is captured by the likelihood ratio, 
)|(
)|(
HeP
HeP

. 
When relating to the reliability of a source, the more reliable a source is, the greater the 
likelihood ratio (on Bayesian approaches to source reliability, see Bovens & Hartmann, 2003; 
Corner, Harris, & Hahn, 2010; Hahn et al., 2009; Hahn et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2011). In the 
basic case where e corresponds simply to an assertion of H by a source, a likelihood ratio 
below 1 indicates a source who is essentially a liar – they are more likely to provide positive 
evidence if the hypothesis is false than if it is true, whilst a likelihood ratio equal to 1 
represents a maximally uninformative source – for they are equally likely to provide positive 
evidence if the hypothesis is false as if it is true. In the simplified appeal to expert opinion we 
will consider in our experiment, the expert is asserting H. We will make this clearer in our 
notation by replacing e with Hrep. Thus, the likelihood ratio concerns the relationship between 
the likelihood of the source reporting that H is true when indeed it is, P(Hrep|H), and an 
erroneous report that H is true when, in fact, it is not, P(Hrep|¬H). 
 From the above, we have the core component of the Bayesian account of the appeal to 
expert opinion. One can see that the argument is likely to be more persuasive the greater the 
value of 
)|(
)|(
HHP
HHP
rep
rep

 , and will have some influence on increasing one’s belief in the truth 
of the hypothesis under consideration wherever this likelihood ratio is greater than one. Can 
we, however, more closely tie the Bayesian approach to those issues previously identified by 
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philosophers (e.g., Table 1)? We can, and in so doing, we can make the account more 
amenable to empirical testing. 
 Hahn et al. (2012) developed a conceptualisation of the appeal to expert opinion using 
a Bayesian network. The network proposed is shown in Fig. 1. The first aspect of this 
approach to note is that it is not a different approach to evaluating the likelihood ratios from 
that outlined above. Trustworthiness and expertise can be captured in the likelihood ratio of 
P(Hrep|evidence) (as spelled out in Hahn et al., 2009; see also, Schum, 1981), and P(Hrep|H) 
can then be obtained through marginalizing out the conditional probabilities that depend on 
the evidence using the formula for marginalization and the chain rule for joint probabilities. 
Thus in Fig. 1, evidence, trustworthiness and expertise are intrinsic to the model. If only Hrep 
and H are explicit in the model, however, the other components can be considered to be 
captured extrinsically in the assignment of P(Hrep|H) (see also, Bovens & Hartmann, 2003).   
The reports of other experts (S2 and S3 in Fig. 1, where all experts’ reports are 
conditionally independent given H) will result in different degrees of belief in the hypothesis, 
which can be captured in the prior probability, P(H) in Equation 1.
2
 The Bayesian network is 
a principled way of representing the conditional dependencies between different concepts 
(Pearl, 2000). We next outline how Fig. 1 captures all the key criteria outlined in Table 1 (see 
also, Hahn et al., 2012).  
 The first two questions, ‘expertise’ and ‘field’, are captured by the expertise node. In 
considering these two questions in a single node, we recognise that expertise is typically 
narrow in focus and therefore must be within the field in question so as to qualify as expertise 
(on the field specificity of expertise see, Ericsson & Lehman, 1996). The ‘opinion’ question 
is captured by the probabilistic relationship between H and Hrep. In designating the expert’s 
report as Hrep, we are modelling a situation in which the expert is directly asserting that H is 
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true. In other situations, however, the expert might merely report a fact that is related to the 
truth of H. In Fig. 1, this would be akin to reporting Evidence. The degree to which this 
implies the truth of H would be captured in the probabilistic relationship between H and 
Evidence. The ‘trustworthiness’ question is captured by the trustworthiness node. The 
‘consistency’ question is represented by the nodes ‘Hrep (from S2)’ and ‘Hrep (from S3)’. 
These nodes are ‘descendants’of node H demonstrating that they should be affected by the 
truth value of H. Finally, the ‘backup evidence question’ is captured by the inclusion of the 
‘evidence’ node between H and Hrep. In reality, this evidence might take many forms, but, for 
the argument to be convincing, there must be a positive relationship between the ‘evidence’ 
and H. Whilst the links (or ‘arcs’) drawn in Fig. 1 demonstrate conditional dependencies 
between variables (‘nodes’), it is worth drawing attention to those arcs that could have been 
included, but were not, as these are informative regarding the assumptions that we are 
making. These assumptions include the conditional independence of the different experts, 
represented by the lack of a link between the different Hrep  nodes other than via H. Of course, 
in some situations, this will be an unrealistic assumption, as one expert might base their 
opinion primarily on another expert (from reading an academic paper for example). Another 
arc that may have been drawn, but which we have decided to leave out would be from one (or 
both) of the nodes ‘Hrep (from S2/3)’ to the ‘expertise’ or ‘trustworthiness’ node. A situation 
in which such an arc might be considered appropriate would be where other experts have 
explicitly stated that the expert cited in the appeal to expert opinion is (non-) trustworthy (for 
example). What is of import is that the arcs within a Bayesian Network represent assumed 
conditional dependencies, and these might differ from one situation to another. Fig. 1 does, 
however, seem a reasonable model to assume for a variety of situations, and, in particular, the 
assumptions seem reasonable for the situation we will be examining in our experiments.   
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 That said, the model presented in Fig. 1 can be further simplified. Whilst Fig. 1 is 
explicit in capturing all the key criteria in Table 1, the core aspects of the argument form can 
be captured in the simplified model, Fig. 2. In Fig. 2, Walton’s “Backup evidence question” 
is subsumed in the expertise node, as the expert would not be behaving as an expert on this 
occasion if they were to provide a report of evidence without evidence for that report.
3
 
Because ‘Hrep (from S2/3)’ only have arcs to H, their effects can be represented solely by H,  
and thus the consistency question will simply be reflected in prior degrees of belief in H. The 
reason why consistency with other experts is a core criterion for the appeal to expert opinion 
is because the statements of other experts affect the likelihood of H (as captured by the links 
between these nodes). If H is known, no additional information is gained from ‘Hrep (from 
S2/3)’. H is said to ‘screen off’ the influence of these variables, and hence the ‘consistency’ 
question can be captured by different prior degrees of belief in H. (on screening off, see e.g., 
Pearl, 1988). The Field question is not explicit in either Fig. 1 or Fig. 2. We argue that the 
Field question is an integral part of the Expertise question and do not therefore represent it 
separately. Not only is expertise invariably narrow in its scope (see e.g., Ericsson & Lehman, 
1996), but recipients have been shown to be sensitive to the particular scope of an expert’s 
expertise in evaluating his or her claim (e.g., Maddox & Rogers, 1980; Pornpitakpan & 
Francis, 2001; but see, Hornikx, 2011; Hornikx & Hoeken, 2007, for cultural differences in 
this sensitivity). One component of the appeal to expert opinion not explicitly captured in 
either Fig. 1 or Fig. 2 is the reliability of the individual advancing the appeal to expert 
opinion. This is because we are directing the model to address the critical questions advanced 
by Walton (1997). Consequently, in the empirical work that follows, we assume that this 
argument proponent is perceived as a fully reliable source by participants – an assumption 
which we believe is tenable given the experimental setup. The simple models in Fig. 1 and 
Fig. 2 could, however, be straightforwardly extended to include consideration of the arguer’s 
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potential unreliability by including ‘Hrep (from arguer)’ as a child of ‘Hrep (from S)’, with 
corresponding trustworthiness and expertise parameters in Fig. 1. 
 The structure of our formalisation of the appeal to expert opinion, in terms of the 
assumed conditional (in)dependencies can be straightforwardly read off from the figures The 
critical factor for inference via Bayesian Networks are the probabilities governing the 
different nodes. Because Hrep has three parents (H, Exp and T), the value of Hrep is conditional 
on the value of these nodes. We are proposing Figs. 1 and 2 as formalisations of the appeal to 
expert opinion. Consequently, we are modelling the situation in which an expert has actually 
made a report concerning the truth or falsity of the hypothesis.
4
 P(Report), P(Rep),  in this 
formalisation, concerns the value of this report – the expert either provides a confirmatory 
(Rep) or disconfirmatory (¬Rep) report. In the experiments reported below, the probabilities 
for the conditional relationships between the variables in Fig. 2 were determined a priori in 
such a way that they match the set-up in our experiments 
In assigning probabilities to capture expertise, for the experiments below we followed 
the approach of Bovens and Hartmann (2003). This approach (used also, for example, in 
Jarvstad & Hahn, 2011) takes the genuine expert to simply report the evidence accurately, 
whereas the maximally unreliable source (non-expert) reports in a way that bears no 
systematic relationship with the evidence. In other words, from the perspective of the 
argument’s recipient, the non-expert functions like a randomiser: that is, the non-expert is as 
likely to report ‘yes’ as he is to report ‘no’, regardless of what the evidence actually says. In a 
novel development from Bovens and Hartmann’s work on source reliability, we here 
distinguish expertise from trustworthiness (as implied in Walton, 1997, 2008a; see also, 
Fearnside & Holther, 1959; Schum, 1981)
5
. Whilst expertise essentially functions to 
determine the likelihood of an honest mistake, trustworthiness captures the likelihood of 
systematic deceit. That is, we assume a trustworthy source will report the value of the 
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hypothesis that they believe to be true, whilst a non-trustworthy source will report the 
opposite value. Consequently, a trustworthy expert will report the true value of the 
hypothesis, a non-trustworthy expert will report the opposite of this, and both trustworthy and 
non-trustworthy non-experts will report random values (the full conditional probability table 
is shown in Table 2). Note that, as with the choice of which dependencies to be included in 
the Bayesian Network, our stipulation of the conditional probabilities entail assumptions for 
the model. One could, of course, entertain different assumptions. Bovens and Hartmann, for 
example, include a parameter to represent inherent bias in a randomiser (non-expert) to 
provide a confirmatory report. A similar free parameter could be added to our model. Of 
course any such parameter, like any more fine-grained modelling of a situation in general, is 
useful and appropriate only where the situation contains information that pertains to those 
distinctions. Hence, in the spirit of maintaining model simplicity (and therefore generality), 
we do not employ such a parameter here, because the probabilistic relationships we assume 
between the variables seem representative of the experimental set-up that we will employ to 
investigate how people evaluate appeals to expert opinion. 
The nature of our distinction between trust and expertise aligns well with Shafto, 
Eaves, Navarro and Perfors’ (2012) distinction between helpfulness (trustworthiness) and 
knowledgability (expertise). They found that children’s use of adult testimony was better 
described by a model including both these components than one including knowledge alone. 
The conditional probabilities assumed in Table 2 give trustworthiness and expertise the same 
roles as helpfulness and knowledgability in Shafto et al. 
Our theoretical treatment of the appeal to expert opinion is also consistent with 
applications of Bayesian Networks in the legal domain (e.g., Kadane & Schum, 1996), 
specifically with recent demonstrations that complex chains of inference in legal contexts 
might be broken down into simple components that recur repeatedly (Lagnado, 2011; Fenton, 
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Neil & Lagnado, 2013; Lagnado et al., 2013). A similarly generic model of  the appeal to 
expert opinion is important here, because such appeals often play a hugely prominent role 
within the law (e.g., Godden & Walton, 2006; Walton, 1997, Chapter 6, 2008a).  
These past applications concern the possibility of Bayesian formalisation itself. Once 
such a formalisation is in place, however, one may ask also to what extent people’s intuitive 
judgments of appeals to expert opinion match that formal treatment. Because the Bayesian 
framework itself has a well-developed claim to normative status (founded on considerations 
of instrumental rationality, but also the minimization of inaccuracy of our beliefs see e.g., 
Lindley, 1994; Rosenkrantz, 1992; and Corner & Hahn, 2013, for general discussion of the 
issue of norms for argumentation) our formalization provides a candidate computational level 
theory of human behaviour: that is, a characterization of what it is that people are seeking to 
do, not in terms of underlying psychological process but rather in terms of a characterization 
of the problem the behaviour in question is seeking to solve. In other words, our 
formalisation provides the basis for a potential rational analysis of people’s judgments 
concerning appeals to expert opinion that seeks to understand such judgments as 
approximations to the rational norm (on rational analysis, see e.g., Anderson, 1990; Chater & 
Oaksford, 1999). Such an analysis does not assume that people consciously and deliberately 
conduct Bayesian calculations (indeed, many domains, such as vision, in which Bayesian 
analyses have been applied allow no introspective access to underlying processes at all, on 
perception as Bayesian inference, see e.g., Knill & Roberts, 1996). Rather, it is entirely silent 
on the actual algorithms people might be employing. The goal is simply to provide a 
functional explanation for why those judgments are the way they are.  
At the same time, possession of an appropriate computational level theory will allow 
one to make successful predictions about human behavior. Finally, of course, from the 
perspective of those whose primary interest lies in normative considerations, that is, 
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specification of what we should think of as ‘good arguments’ (as is the case for the 
philosophical literature on argumentation), examining actual judgments of appeals to expert 
opinion and comparing them to Bayesian prescriptions provides insight into how good people 
are at informal argument evaluation.  
The central aim of the experiments presented in this paper was therefore to 
demonstrate the amenability of the Bayesian approach to the development and testing of 
quantitative empirical predictions. The qualitative Bayesian predictions of the effects of the 
three key factors - source expertise, source trustworthiness and the opinions of other experts 
(labelled ‘others’ opinions’ in the empirical sections) - are intuitive, in keeping with 
Laplace’s verdict that the probability calculus is ‘nothing but formalized common sense’ 
(Laplace, 1814/1951). Greater expertise or trustworthiness will increase the impact of the 
testimony on one’s posterior degree of belief.  Likewise, better fit with the opinions of other 
experts will have a positive effect (see Harris & Hahn, 2009, for detailed exploration of the 
issue of coherence between testimonies).  Given this intuitive nature of the qualitative 
predictions, the normative Bayesian predictions deviate from those of other putatively 
normative accounts (e.g., formal approaches to ‘plausible reasoning’, such as Rescher, 1977, 
or, Pollock, 2001; see e.g., Walton, 1997, 2008, and references therein) primarily where some 
of those alternative accounts make somewhat counter-intuitive predictions. This issue has 
been pursued elsewhere (Hahn et al., 2012). Here, we therefore focus on another feature of 
the Bayesian framework: its ability to make detailed quantitative predictions.  
With its grounding in probability theory, the Bayesian framework has the capability to 
make quantitative predictions as to how convinced individuals should be by an argument. 
Because the Bayesian framework stipulates that subjective degrees of belief should be 
represented as probabilities, one must elicit these probabilities in some way. One approach is 
to engage in a model-fitting exercise to demonstrate that the quantitative pattern of results 
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observed is obtainable from a Bayesian model – fitting parameters rather than attempting to 
elicit them empirically (as in Hahn & Oaksford, 2007a). A second approach is to present 
participants with an experimental scenario in which the quantitative parameters are defined in 
the problem (as in Harris & Hahn, 2009). Finally, one can ask participants for the necessary 
parameter values and use these to predict participants’ posterior convincingness ratings – that 
is, P(H|argument), in the current project, P(H|Rep) (as in Harris, Hsu and Madsen, 2012; see 
also, Fernbach & Erb, 2013). In Experiment 1, we adopt the latter approach as closely as 
possible, introducing only three free parameters (relating to just one variable). In Experiment 
2, we elicit ratings from participants for that variable also and our model therefore includes 
no free parameters in that test
6
. The experiments demonstrate how implementing a scheme-
based treatment within a Bayesian model enables quantitative testing of the suitability of that 
model as a computational level description of people’s argumentation skills. Furthermore, the 
results are encouraging in the sense of the closeness of the fit between behavior and 
prediction. 
 
Experiment 1 
 
 Experiment 1 was designed to determine whether people are sensitive to the critical 
factors that should influence the convincingness of an appeal to expert opinion. More 
specifically, it was intended to test the degree to which participants’ quantitative probability 
ratings approximated the prescriptions of a Bayesian formalisation of the appeal to expert 
opinion incorporating the notions of expertise and trustworthiness. The model being tested 
was the simplified model shown in Fig. 2. In this test, parameter estimates for the prior 
probabilities P(Expertise) and P(Trustworthiness) [hereafter, P(Exp) and P(T)] were elicited 
from participants, whilst P(Hypothesis) [hereafter, P(H)], was a free parameter. This prior 
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degree of belief in the hypothesis also captures variance from additional sources of 
knowledge about the hypothesis – such as the manipulation in the present study of whether 
other experts agreed with the expert cited within the argumentation dialogue. 
  
 
Method 
Participants 
 29 males and 55 females, aged between 18 and 80 (median = 20) participated in the 
experiment without remuneration. The study was advertised on 
http://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html, a site for recruiting volunteers to 
participate in web-based experiments.  
 
Design and Materials 
 A 3x2x2 mixed design was employed, with others’ opinions as a between-participant 
variable (3-levels) and expertise and trustworthiness as within-participant variables. 
 We here describe the materials in an order that makes the relevance of each measure 
clear, rather than chronologically. The chronology of the experiment is outlined in the 
Procedure and Fig. 4. 
Participants were presented with appeals to expert opinion within a dialogue (e.g., 
Fig. 3). Each dialogue had the same structure, with a male proponent presenting an appeal to 
expert opinion (where the expert was always male) to a female recipient. Four different 
argument topics were used to incorporate the within-participant manipulations. The topics 
concerned fictional medical information: whether Proftanine would lower cholestrol; whether 
handling Kworgs causes skin blemishes; whether taking Antiprone causes insomnia; and 
whether exposure to Bongus causes painful swelling. The expertise manipulation was 
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operationalised through having the expert be either a doctor (high expertise) or a musician 
(low expertise). Trustworthiness was manipulated through having the expert be a friend of the 
argument proponent (high trust) or an enemy of the argument proponent (low trust). Others’ 
opinion was manipulated in the final sentence of the dialogue. There was either no mention of 
other experts (as in Fig. 3), or other experts were said to agree [or disagree], through adding 
the sentence: ‘I also read in ‘Science’ magazine that a number of experiments have been 
completed across the world and it is now considered to be medical fact that eating Proftanine 
[does NOT] lower(s) cholestrol.’ The pairing of the drug-effect dialogues with a particular 
experimental condition (i.e. the expertise and trustworthiness of the source and whether 
others agreed) was implemented in a latin square design such that, across participants, each 
experimental condition occurred in each drug-effect dialogue. Each individual participant, 
however, only saw one example of each dialogue and each experimental condition, so as to 
minimise demand effects. 
 Participants provided posterior degree of belief ratings (hereafter, ‘convincingness 
ratings’) by moving a slider in response to the question: ‘In light of the dialogue above, what 
do you think Anne’s opinion should now be of Proftanine?’ The slider was anchored at 
‘Completely convinced it does NOT lower cholestrol’ and ‘Completely convinced it DOES 
lower cholestrol,’ and recorded responses (participants saw no numbers) as a number 
between 0 and 100, thus providing a percentage value for P(Hypothesis|Report) [P(H|Rep)]. 
In addition to rating the convincingness of an argument, participants provided prior 
belief ratings for the variables P(Exp)  and P(T). We set up the experiment in such a way to 
capture the conditional relationships that we assumed in Table 2. Thus, for the 
trustworthiness question, participants were asked:  
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'Imagine the following scenario: Keith is a musician who is an old enemy of James 
and they are discussing whether taking Proftanine lowers cholestrol. 
 
How likely do you think it is that Keith would  deliberately give James wrong  
information about whether taking Proftanine lowers cholestrol?’ 
 
Whilst this may or may not concur with people’s everyday understanding of the term 
trustworthiness, it captures the characteristics of the concept within the model under 
consideration (Fig. 2, Table 2). Participants answered by moving a slider on a scale anchored 
at ‘I'm completely convinced he would NOT deliberately give James wrong information.’ and 
‘I'm completely convinced he WOULD deliberately give Jonathan wrong information.’ 
Responses to this question were subsequently subtracted from 100, to provide a percentage 
value for P(T). 
 For expertise, participants were asked: ‘How likely do you think it is that Keith is an 
expert on whether taking Proftanine lowers cholestrol?’ and responses were made using a 
slider anchored at ‘I'm completely convinced he is NOT an expert’ and ‘I'm completely 
convinced he IS an expert.’ We acknowledge that this question might not match as directly to 
the conditional relationships outlined in Table 2 as the Trustworthiness question. We contend, 
however, that providing a precise continuous estimate for this concept, as our participants 
must do, requires a precise definition of this concept – as precise probabilities of imprecise 
events are nonsensical (see e.g., Wallsten, 1990). We assume that the most appropriate 
precise definition is that provided in Table 2,  in line with recent approaches within 
epistemology (e.g., Bovens & Hartmann, 2003) As such, our approach aims to describe the 
situation in such a way as to lead participants’ subjective estimates of the relevant conditional 
probabilities in the direction of those outlined in Table 2. An alternative approach is to elicit 
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these subjective probabilities from participants. We chose the current approach to reduce the 
complexity of the task for participants.  
For completeness, participants also provided posterior ratings of the expertise and 
trustworthiness of the expert after having read the dialogue containing the argument, thus 
providing estimates of P(Exp|Rep) and P(T|Rep). These were made using the same scales (& 
were in response to the exact same questions) as for their prior ratings of expertise and 
trustworthiness. These questions were presented beneath the dialogue of the argument. 
 All non-central aspects of the experiment, such as the names used, and orders of 
presentation were randomised across participants. 
 
Procedure 
 The experiment was run online using Adobe Flash. After consenting to participate in 
the study, participants first provided their prior ratings of trust and expertise for all four 
arguments they were to be presented with. Subsequently, they viewed each argument, rated 
its convincingness and, on the next page, provided posterior estimates of the expert’s likely 
trustworthiness and expertise, before moving onto the next argument. Finally, participants 
provided their demographic details before receiving debrief information (see Fig. 4 for a 
schematic of the experimental procedure). 
 
Results
7 
 
 A 3x2x2 mixed ANOVA yielded significant main effects (in the predicted direction, 
see Table 3) of all three independent variables: Others’ opinions, F(2, 81) = 32.53, p < .001, 
etap
2
 = .45; Expertise, F(1, 81) = 34.38, p < .001, etap
2
 = .298; Trustworthiness, F(1, 81) = 
11.14, p = .001, etap
2
 = .121.
8
 The only significant interaction was between Trustworthiness 
APPEAL TO EXPERT OPINION    21 
 
 
 
and Others’ opinions, F(2, 81) = 3.27, p = .043, etap
2
 = .075. As Fig. 5 demonstrates, this 
interaction resulted from the trustworthiness manipulation having no effect when other 
experts disagreed with the position advanced in the dialogue. 
 
Quantitative comparisons of Bayesian predictions with observed ratings 
 The main analyses of interest concerned the model fitting between the Bayesian 
predictions of how convincing the argument should be perceived to be, and participants’ 
convincingness ratings (which were divided by 100 to provide values between 0 and 1 in all 
subsequent analyses). The model being tested is that shown in Fig. 2. As the report from the 
expert is provided, P(Rep) = 1, the remaining required parameters for the calculation of a 
Bayesian posterior, P(H|Rep), are the priors P(H), P(T) and P(Exp) and the conditional 
probability table for the network. As discussed above, the conditional probabilities were 
assumed a priori (see Table 2). P(T) and P(Exp) were provided by participants in the 
experiment as percentages (see Table 4). P(H) was therefore the only free parameter in the 
model, and we estimated a best fitting value for it separately for each level of the Others’ 
opinions variable (minimising the mean squared error between participants’ convincingness 
ratings and the Bayesian predictions). The choice of three free parameters was thus 
theoretically and empirically justified (as a significant effect of Others’ opinions was 
observed in the ANOVA above). The best fitting values of P(H) in the three conditions were 
.4125, .5565 and .1670 (no mention, others agree and others disagree respectively). The 
Bayesian predictions can then be calculated using Equation 1, with Rep substituted for e. In 
order to use Equation 1, P(Rep|H) and P(Rep|¬H) were obtained through marginalising over 
Exp and T, using the values from Table 2. For example, 
P(Rep|H) = P(Rep|H,Exp,T)*P(Exp,T) + P(Rep|H,Exp,¬T)*P(Exp,¬T) +        
     P(Rep|H,¬Exp,¬T)*P(¬Exp,¬T) + P(Rep|H,¬Exp,T)*P(¬Exp,T)                (2) 
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Conditional independence of P(Exp) and P(T) was assumed (see Fig. 2) and so P(Exp,T) = 
P(Exp) × P(T). 
 A good fit was observed between the convincingness ratings provided by participants 
and the Bayesian predictions, accounting for 89% of variance across conditions (p<.001) 
(Fig. 6). An inspection of Fig. 6 clearly shows that the Bayesian model performs least well 
when other experts are said to disagree with the report of the cited expert. Although the 95% 
confidence intervals overlap in all instances, the ‘predictions’ line is clearly more affected by 
the evidence from the trustworthy doctor than is the ‘observed’ line. Closer analysis of the 
raw data shows that there are a number of participants whose predicted convincingness is 1 
(14 datapoints), because they have provided ratings indicating certainty for both the 
trustworthiness and expertise prior questions. When participants whose predicted ratings are 
1  (there were none whose predicted ratings were zero) are excluded from the overall average 
across all conditions, the ‘peakiness’ in the ‘predictions’ line is reduced (see Fig. 7) and the 
model fit increases to explain 93% of the variance across conditions.  This suggests that the 
clear outlier in the ‘predictions’ for the ‘others disagree, friend, doctor’ condition is 
predominantly driven by those participants who have provided what might be seen to be 
unrealistically high certainty ratings for their priors of expertise and trustworthiness –we 
suspect that, if pushed, these participants would provide ratings near to certainty, but 
acknowledge the possibility that the opposite state of affairs could hold true, which is not 
possible when estimates of certainty are provided.  
The above analysis demonstrates a good fit between participants’ convincingness 
ratings and the predictions of the Bayesian model. A further method for testing whether 
participants’ ratings provide a good approximation to the Bayesian model is to examine how 
they differ. The predicted and observed ratings could differ in a random manner, or there 
might be systematic effects that the observed ratings are sensitive to that are not predicted by 
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the model (or vice versa). A straightforward way to test this is to enter ‘predicted/observed’ 
as a variable in a 4-way ANOVA that also includes the 3 experimental variables. Interactions 
involving the ‘predicted/observed’ variable demonstrate a situation in which participants’ 
observed ratings are reacting systematically differently from the predictions of the model. 
The 4-way ANOVA (excluding predicted posteriors of 1, since they are likely to distort 
predictions disproportionately) suggested that the non-parallelism shown in the right most 
portion of Fig. 6 does correspond to a systematic difference between the Bayesian predictions 
and the observed ratings, as the 3-way interaction between ‘predicted/observed’, ‘expertise’ 
and ‘others’ opinions’ was significant, F(2, 70) = 3.81, p = .027. No other effects involving 
the ‘predicted/observed’ variable reached significance (all ps > .22) 9.  
There is then one significant point of systematic disagreement between model and 
data. Given, however, that this complex 3-way interaction was the only significant interaction 
out of 7 possible interactions (three 2-way, three 3-way and one 4-way), there is little 
systematic mismatch between participants and model, thus further emphasising that, overall  
participants’ ratings are reasonable approximations to the Bayesian predictions. 
The above analyses provide good support for the contention that people’s responses to 
appeals to expert opinion are well approximated by a Bayesian theory. As a further test of 
this contention, participants’ ratings of the trustworthiness of the expert and the expertise of 
the expert following the argumentation dialogue, P(T|Rep) and P(Exp|Rep), were compared 
with the predictions of the Bayesian model (obtained via Equations 2 and 1, switching H with 
T and H with Exp respectively). In this case, values of P(H) were not refitted to the data, 
rather the same parameters as for the convincingness ratings were used.  
Values for P(H) were specifically fit to the data so as to maximise the fit between 
participants’ convincingness ratings and the Bayesian predictions, not their expertise or 
trustworthiness ratings. Consequently, we expect the fits between observed and predicted 
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ratings of P(Exp|Rep) and P(T|Rep) to be less good than those for P(H|Rep). The significant 
positive correlation between the predicted and observed values of expertise, P(Exp|Rep), 
r(10) = .90, p < .001, indicating that 81% of variance (81.5% if predictions of certainty 
[either 0 or 1] are excluded - 39 datapoints)  in posterior expertise ratings across conditions 
was predicted by the model (Fig. 8), does however provide further support for the Bayesian 
theory as an approximation of how people evaluate argumentation, and update their beliefs. 
Once more, a 4-way ANOVA was conducted (excluding predicted posteriors of certainty, 
since they are likely to distort predictions disproportionately) to determine the systematicity 
of the differences between the Bayesian predictions and participants’ observed posteriors. 
Out of 7 possible interactions, two were significant (all other ps > .16), ‘predicted/observed’ 
x ‘others’ opinions’, F(2, 57) = 8.24, p = .001, and ‘predicted/observed’ x ‘expertise’ x 
‘others’ opinions’, F(2, 57) = 4.25, p = .019.10 
For posterior ratings of trustworthiness, Fig. 9 shows the excellent correspondence 
between participants’ posterior ratings of the expert’s trustworthiness, P(T|Rep), and the 
Bayesian predictions (using the same parameters once more), r(10) = .97, p < .001, indicating 
that 94% of variance (88% if predictions of certainty [either 0 or 1] are excluded – 65 
datapoints) in trustworthiness posterior ratings across conditions can be explained by the 
Bayesian model. Furthermore, in a 4-way ANOVA (excluding predicted posteriors of 
certainty), there were no significant interactions involving the ‘predicted/observed’ variable 
(all ps > .28)
11
 . 
Finally, as the same parameter values were used for all fits, a correlation was 
computed across the three dependent variables simultaneously. It was found that the Bayesian 
model was able to account for 89% of the variance across all 36 datapoints, r(34) = .94, p < 
.001, with just the three free parameters. This value is the same if predictions of certainty (0 
or 1) are excluded. 
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The analyses above assessed the fit of the model to the mean participant response in 
each experimental condition. One can also use an individual-level analysis, in which a 
correlation coefficient is computed for each participant and then the average of these is 
computed. Because ‘others’ opinion’ was a between-participants variable, this reduces the 
number of datapoints in the analysis. Were we to simply look at the posterior ratings of 
convincingness, this correlation would be based on only 4 datapoints per participant. We 
therefore only report the results of this analysis for the correlation incorporating all 
judgments made by a participant (i.e., P(H|Rep), P(T|Rep) and P(Exp|Rep)). The resulting 
analysis suggested that 38% of variance in participants’ responses was explained by the 
Bayesian model, and for all but 3 participants the correlation with the model was positive, 
with this correlation coefficient being significant for 55 out of the total 84 participants. For 
the remaining 29 participants, some of them will have not engaged with the task, but the 
question of whether the ratings of a group of them might be well captured by an alternative 
model (e.g., another Bayesian model with alternative assumptions) is an example of the sort 
of further questions that this line of research can generate. 
 
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 1 provided good support for the Bayesian model of the appeal to expert 
opinion as one that human reasoning approximates. Experiment 2 was designed as a more 
robust replication of Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, the model was fit to the data with three 
free parameters. This is common practice in model fitting. In Experiment 2, however, we 
provided a more  rigorous test of the model by conducting a parameter free test. This was 
achieved by additionally asking participants to provide estimates for the free parameters in 
Experiment 1, P(H).  
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Method 
Participants 
23 males and 34 females, aged between 16 and 54 (median = 23), who participated in 
the experiment without remuneration, were retained for analysis after excluding two 
participants under the age of 16 (in line with BPS ethical guidelines) and one who reported 
their age as 99(!). As a result of these exclusions, there was minor imbalance in the sample 
size for each condition with 18 participants in the ‘others disagree’ condition, 19 in the 
‘others agree’ condition and 20 in the ‘no mention of others’ condition. The study was 
advertised on http://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html, a site for recruiting 
volunteers to participate in web-based experiments. 
 
Design, Materials and Procedure 
 There were two changes from the method employed in Experiment 1. The first was to 
reword the question eliciting P(Exp) so as to ensure it was a better match for the expertise 
variable as its characteristics are described in Table 2. Subsequently, participants were asked 
(for example), “How likely do you think it is that Keith knows whether taking Proftanine 
lowers cholestrol” and responded on a scale anchored at “I’m completely convinced he would 
NOT know” and “I’m completely convinced he WOULD know.” This was to guard against 
participants’ own idiosyncratic understandings of the term ‘expert.’   
 The second change was more consequential. Participants provided their own estimates 
for the P(H) parameter. After having provided their prior ratings for trust and expertise, 
participants were presented with a screen designed to elicit their ratings of the prior belief of 
the recipient of the argument. As discussed in the Introduction, the opinions of other experts 
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can be captured in the prior probability, and the question we asked participants was designed 
to be faithful to that (see also Footnote 2). Participants therefore read (for example – in the 
‘others agree’ condition): 
  
Anne has no idea whether taking Proftanine lowers cholestrol. 
She then reads in Science magazine that a number of experiments have been 
completed across the world and most experts are agreed that taking Proftanine lowers 
cholestrol. 
 
What do you think Anne’s opinion should now be of Proftanine?12 
 
Participants made their response using a slider anchored at “Completely convinced taking 
Proftanine does NOT lower cholestrol” and “Completely convinced taking Proftanine DOES 
lower cholestrol.” Participants only provided one rating of the prior probability. The mention 
of other experts was specific to the experimental condition to which they were assigned (with 
the second sentence simply absent in the ‘no mention of others’ condition), and the precise 
issue that they reported a prior probability for was randomised between participants. This 
design was chosen so as to reduce the potential for experimental pragmatics to play a role 
when participants might perceive that they are being asked the same question four times (i.e., 
if experts state….what should your degree of belief be?). 
 All other aspects of the experimental method were the same as Experiment 1 (see Fig. 
4 for the complete experimental procedure). 
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Results 
A 3x2x2 mixed ANOVA yielded significant main effects (in the predicted direction, 
see Table 3) of all three independent variables: Others’ opinions, F(2, 54) = 23.39, p < .001, 
etap
2
 = .46; Expertise, F(1, 54) = 6.42, p = .014, etap
2
 = .106; Trustworthiness, F(1, 54) = 
20.94, p < .001, etap
2
 = .279. There were no significant interactions. 
 
Quantitative comparisons of Bayesian predictions with observed ratings 
The fit of the model was tested as in Experiment 1, with the conditional probabilities 
assumed a priori (see Table 2). The only difference was that all remaining parameters were 
estimated by participants (see Table 4), such that there were no free parameters in the model. 
A good fit was again observed between the convincingness ratings provided by 
participants and the Bayesian predictions, accounting for 94% of variance across conditions 
(p<.001) (Fig. 10). An inspection of Fig. 10 suggests, as in Experiment 1, although less 
strongly, that the Bayesian model performs least well when other experts are said to disagree 
with the report of the cited expert. Although the 95% confidence intervals overlap in all 
instances, the ‘predictions’ line is clearly more affected by the evidence from the trustworthy 
doctor than is the ‘observed’ line. In this instance, excluding datapoints that include predicted 
posteriors of certainty (0 or 1; 38 datapoints), either because participants have provided 
ratings indicating certainty for both the trustworthiness and expertise prior questions, or for 
the P(H) question, had a negligible effect on the model fit.  
As in Experiment 1, we carried out a 4-way ANOVA, incorporating 
‘predicted/observed’ as a variable to test whether there are systematic differences between the 
model’s predictions and the observed ratings. The 4-way ANOVA (excluding predicted 
posteriors of 0 or 1, since they are likely to distort predictions disproportionately) suggested 
that there were no systematic differences between the Bayesian predictions and the observed 
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ratings, as no interactions involving ‘predicted/observed’ were significant, although the 3-
way interaction between ‘predicted/observed’, ‘trust’ and ‘others’ opinions’ approached 
significance, F(2, 40) = 2.56, p = .09 (all other ps > .395)
13
. Thus, there is no significant 
systematic mismatch between participants and model, further suggesting that, overall, 
participants’ ratings are reasonable approximations to the Bayesian predictions. 
The above analyses provide good support for the contention that people’s responses to 
appeals to expert opinion are well approximated by a Bayesian theory. As a further test of 
this contention, participants’ ratings of the trustworthiness of the expert and the expertise of 
the expert following the argumentation dialogue,  P(T|Rep) and P(Exp|Rep), were compared 
with the predictions of the Bayesian model.  
The significant positive correlation between the predicted and observed values of 
expertise, P(Exp|Rep), r(10) = .94, p < .001, indicating that 88% of variance in posterior 
expertise ratings across conditions was predicted by the model (Fig. 11), provides further 
support for the Bayesian theory as an approximation of how people evaluate argumentation, 
and update their beliefs. Once more, a 4-way ANOVA was conducted to determine the 
systematicity of the differences between the Bayesian predictions and participants’ observed 
posteriors. No interactions were significant, either when ratings of certainty were excluded 
(35 datapoints; all ps > .31), or when they were not (all ps > .11). 
 For posterior ratings of trustworthiness, the fit was not quite as good as in 
Experiment 1, but nevertheless, 83% of variance (p < .001) in participants’ posterior ratings 
of the expert’s trustworthiness was explained by the model (Fig. 12). In a 4-way ANOVA, 
only 1 out of 7 possible interactions was significant – with the ‘Others’ opinion variable’, 
F(2, 54) = 5.06, p = .01 (all other ps > .06). When predictions of certainty were excluded (53 
datapoints), this interaction became non-significant (p > .13), but the interaction with 
Trustworthiness reached significance, F(1, 25) = 4.31, p = .048 (all other ps > .13).   
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Finally, a correlation was computed across the three dependent variables 
simultaneously. It was found that the Bayesian model was able to account for 90% of the 
variance across all 36 datapoints, r(34) = .95, p < .001, with no free parameters. 
In the same individual-level analysis as conducted for Experiment 1, across all 
judgments made by each participant (P(H|Rep), P(T|Rep) and P(Exp|Rep)), 38% of variance 
in participants’ responses was found to be explainable by the Bayesian model. For all but 3 
participants the correlation with the model was positive, with this correlation coefficient 
being significant for 40 out of the total 57 participants.  
Finally, because no free parameters were fit to the data in Study 2, it provided ideal 
conditions for comparing the performance of the model in Fig. 2 with two models that are 
nested within Fig. 2, to determine the degree to which participants were sensitive to all the 
factors in the model. Specifically, we generated predictions from a model which ignored the 
information about perceived expertise, and one which ignored information about perceived 
trustworthiness (we specify the equations in Appendix 1 for maximum clarity). The model 
ignoring trustworthiness accounted for 70% of the data at the group level, whilst that ignoring 
expertise accounted for 84% of the data. Thus, the data were 286 times more likely under the 
full model than under the best performing nested model (Glover & Dixon, 2004). Although 
our design gave us only 4 datapoints per participant for convincingness ratings, we sought to 
compare the individual level correlations across the three different models. The good group-
level fit observed could potentially result not from participants being sensitive to the three 
relevant factors, P(H), P(Exp) and P(T), and the complex interactions between them, but 
from different subgroups of participants being sensitive to different individual parameters (in 
a less sophisticated way) (see Page, 2007). In order to provide some preliminary evidence 
that this is not the case (although necessarily weak, given the limited number of datapoints 
per participant), we compared the number of participants whose 4 convincingness ratings 
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were best explained by each of the 3 models. If the good group level fits result from a 
combination of distinct groups of participants each using simple strategies, there will be more 
participants whose ratings are best explained by the model excluding either trustworthiness or 
expertise than the full model. This was not the result we observed. For the 50 participants for 
whom such a correlation was possible, the results for 27 were best explained by the full 
model (15 by the model excluding trustworthiness and 8 by the model excluding expertise).  
Overall, therefore, good support was observed for the contention that participants’ 
judgments may be considered  (somewhat) noisy estimates of the Bayesian model’s 
predictions. 
 
General Discussion 
 In this paper, we have suggested an approach for a reconciliation between the scheme-
based approach to argumentation (see Walton et al., 2008) and the Bayesian approach (see 
Hahn & Oaksford, 2007a) using the appeal to expert opinion as an example case. 
Furthermore, we have demonstrated how such an approach enables the formulation and 
testing of precise quantitative predictions. In two example experiments, our results 
demonstrated that participants’ quantitative ratings of the convincingness of a conclusion 
following appeals to expert opinion were seemingly well predicted by a Bayesian network 
model. Furthermore, subsequent ratings of the expertise and trustworthiness of the expert 
sources were also well predicted by the model. This provides initial support for our 
contention that participants evaluate arguments in a way that is a close approximation to the 
model advanced here. Although the current experiments are intended primarily as example 
cases to demonstrate the amenability of a Bayesian quantitative representation of the scheme-
based approach to testing, finding that participants’ ratings did not diverge wildly from the 
predictions of a Bayesian model, is in line with recent results in cognitive psychology (e.g., 
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Gigerenzer, Hell, & Blank, 1988; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 
2006; Harris & Hahn, 2009; Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007). Of most relevance, Harris et al. 
(2012) provided empirical support for participants’ Bayesian treatment of a simple variation 
of an ad hominem argument, using arguments set in a dialogical context as in the current 
study. These, and the current findings appear to be in line with Mercier and Sperber’s (2011) 
argumentative theory of reasoning. Mercier and Sperber claim that the purpose of reasoning 
is to support argumentation. Hence, human reasoning performance should be at its best when 
set in an argumentation context. The results presented here, and in Harris et al. (2012), offer 
support for the contention that people are good Bayesian reasoners in an argumentation 
context.    
 The results presented here also provide further support for the Bayesian theory of 
argumentation more generally (Hahn & Oaksford, 2006, 2007a), which has previously 
offered empirically tested formalisations of the argument from ignorance (Oaksford & Hahn, 
2004; Hahn & Oaksford, 2007;a Hahn, Oaksford & Bayindir, 2005), circular arguments 
(Hahn & Oaksford, 2007a), slippery slope arguments (Corner, Hahn, & Oaksford, 2009), and 
ad hominem arguments (Harris et al., 2012; Oaksford & Hahn, 2012). That participants’ 
updating of their belief in the trustworthiness and expertise of the expert source was well 
predicted by the Bayesian model provides further support for the model, as do the totally 
parameter-free model fits observed in Experiment 2. Whilst Experiment 2 had no free 
parameters that could be ‘tweaked’ to improve model fits, we did set the conditional 
probabilities in the network a priori. These probabilities seemed appropriate for the 
experimental situation we set up and the questions we were asking. Future research might, 
however, profit from eliciting these conditional probabilities from participants, and testing 
the degree to which they are sensitive to changes in context. Alternatively, the quantitative 
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parameters can be defined by the problem (as in Harris & Hahn, 2009; see also, Harris et al., 
2012, Experiment 3), suggesting another potential avenue for future research.   
In addition to providing initial support for the present model as a computational level 
description of people’s ratings of a simple appeal to expert opinion, the present results are 
informative for maximising the informativeness of future research endeavour within this area, 
by identifying aspects of the argument form that provide better or worse fits between model 
and participant data. Identifying areas of worse fit are informative for model development. 
They can be suggestive of either erroneous assumptions on the part of the modeller, or else 
systematic human bias. In the present experiments, the model was seen to perform least well 
in a situation where the authority was a friendly expert who disagreed with other experts in 
the field (further highlighted by the significant result from the ANOVA analysis that 
demonstrates an interaction between ‘predicted/observed’, ‘expertise’ and ‘others’ opinions’). 
Further research could focus on such situations, so as to determine the cause of this 
discrepancy (potential candidates might include conservative belief revision [e.g., Phillips & 
Edwards, 1966], on the side of systematic cognitive bias, or a missing dependency relation, 
on the side of an erroneous model assumption). Clearly, a potential outcome of such research 
is that evaluation of argumentation cannot be considered an approximation of normative 
Bayesian reasoning, but thus far we have obtained some support, and cited other support, for 
the contention that it can be. 
Another important avenue for future research concerns the question of how to handle 
participants’ ratings of 0 or 1 (certainty). In our analyses, we have also reported results where 
those participants are removed. Whilst this removal generally increases model fits without 
systematically changing the relationship between model and data, in one instance it did. In 
Experiment 2, the pattern of ANOVA results for the trustworthiness posterior demonstrated 
that, whilst when no participants were excluded the effect of the ‘Others’ opinions’ variable 
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was systematically different in the model’s predictions and the observed data, when 
participants’ ratings of 0 or 1 were removed it was the effect of the Trustworthiness variable 
that was different. Future research could potentially check participants’ ratings of certainty by 
asking them a follow-up question delineating what this response actually means, to check that 
they are sure they want to provide that response rather than a response of (for example) .95. 
This is important as identifying those variables whose effects are different in the model as 
opposed to the data can be highly beneficial for model development. 
Finally, our experimental focus here has been on the relationship between the 
experimental conditions and the degree to which people’s posterior degrees of belief in these 
different conditions are in line with the Bayesian predictions. Future research could focus on 
belief change. In such experiments, estimates of P(H) should be elicited for all individual 
scenarios immediately before that argument is subsequently presented, so that the relationship 
between participants’ estimates of P(H) and P(H|Rep) is perceptually evident to them on the 
response slider. 
A standard concern with Bayesian approaches is the question of where should prior 
degrees of belief come from? In the ‘no mention of others’ condition of the current 
experiments, Anne says that she has no idea whether taking Proftanine lowers cholestrol (for 
example). The mean P(H) rating in Experiment 2 in this condition was .49. On the classical 
approach to probability this seems appropriate (dividing half one’s degree of belief between 
H and ¬H). Another approach, however, is for her to use her knowledge of all possible 
substances. She would then recognise that only a very small proportion of these lower 
cholestrol and hence her prior should be very small indeed (e.g., 1 x 10
-something
). One might 
question whether participants’ estimates of P(H) were therefore inflated because of the 
response scale we used (i.e., without the potential to provide infinitesimally small estimates). 
The distribution of responses for P(H) (Figure A1), however, does not suggest many 
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participants saw such a response as appropriate. Recall that P(H) was elicited after P(Exp) 
and P(T). In the latter questions, it is stated that two people are discussing H (e.g., whether 
Proftanine lowers cholestrol). From this, participants are likely to infer that Proftanine is not 
simply a random substance, but rather one that is currently under discussion as a potential 
‘cholestrol lowerer’. Consequently, a value of .49 seems appropriate given this background, 
as do the values of .78 and .20 when experts agree and disagree respectively.      
 The present paper, and the Bayesian approach in general, makes no claim as to the 
process by which people’s ratings ended up being close approximations to the advanced 
model. The Bayesian formalization provides a statement of how people should update their 
belief, and the current data suggest that participants are appropriately sensitive to all the 
relevant parameters manipulated in this experiment. Consequently, these data can be seen to 
provide a potential challenge for so-called dual-process theories of persuasion (the Heuristic 
Systematic Model [Chaiken, 1980]; the Elaboration Likelihood Model [e.g., Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1981]). Persuasion researchers have long been aware of the importance of both 
message content and source characteristics in effecting attitude change (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1984, 1996; Chaiken, 1980). However, message and source characteristics have figured 
largely as tools in the development of process models of persuasion, with processing of 
message content associated with an ‘analytical route’ to persuasion, and processing of 
message source with a ‘heuristic route’. Hence, dual-process theories have typically viewed 
source and message factors in opposition.  
Persuasion research has not formulated clear, general predictions about what should 
happen in circumstances where people might analytically evaluate both source and message 
(though special cases such as the processing of ambiguous messages have been considered, 
Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). A fundamental point to be taken from the present study is 
thus that the relationship between source and message characteristics is a subtle one. Our 
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participants updated their perceptions of the source’s characteristics in relation to the message 
provided, and they did so under circumstances that process-models of persuasion might 
consider to trigger ‘heuristic processing’: namely, the evaluation of fictitious issues in which 
they had no personal stake or involvement. Nevertheless, they appeared to process the 
characteristics of the source in light of the content of the message (the likely truth of the 
message in this experiment being manipulated through the ‘Others’ opinions’ variable), 
suggesting that the analytic and heuristic route to persuasion are not completely separable 
(see also, Hahn et al., 2009; Harris et al., 2013; Jarvstad & Hahn, 2011, Expt. 2; Reimer, 
Mata, & Stoecklin, 2004). Persuasion researchers have entertained the possibility that source 
considerations and message content may influence each other in evaluation (e.g., Chaiken & 
Maheswaran, 1994; Petty & Wegener, 1999). The fact that they seem to do so, suggests that 
how they do so must be properly understood. The Bayesian framework can complement 
social psychological process models through its ability to make clear predictions about 
complex, non-additive relationships between source characteristics and message content, 
providing a framework for evaluating perceptions of trust and expertise. 
  
Analysing the Appeal to Expert Opinion 
 With its inherently defeasible form, the central characteristics of the appeal to expert 
opinion appear to be well suited to a Bayesian Network formalisation. The network presented 
in Fig. 2 and examined in the empirical work here is a very simple network for the appeal to 
expert opinion. The network in Fig. 1 is a slightly richer representation, but there are still 
plenty of ways in which the complexity of the network could be enhanced to provide a fuller 
representation of the argument. As an example, Walton (1997) outlines not only the six 
critical questions shown in Table 1, but questions 1, 2 and 3 have additional sub-questions 
(five, four and four further questions, respectively). These sub-questions provide a means for 
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assessing the truth status of the higher-level questions. For example, the second sub-question 
for question 1 from Table 1 (the expertise question) asks “What degrees, professional 
qualifications, or certification by licensing agencies does E [the expert] hold?” (Walton, 
1997, p. 223). Such a question is easily captured in a Bayesian network through adding an 
additional node for qualifications, whose parent node is expertise (see Fig. 13) – for expertise 
enables one to gain qualifications, and qualifications are thus evidence of expertise. Expertise 
makes the likelihood of qualifications more likely, and therefore the existence of 
qualifications can be seen as evidence of expertise. In the present work, we have simplified 
the situation by only considering the probabilities of the end results (the major critical 
questions), but the Bayesian network can readily be fleshed out so as to explicitly represent 
these additional sources of evidence that enable the higher level inferences of expertise and 
trustworthiness. Fenton et al. (2013) have proposed a series of idioms to represent different 
aspects of the reasoning process in a legal fact-finding context. The separate groups of sub-
questions proposed by Walton could be considered as distinct idioms that could be included 
in a fully explicit Bayesian network formalisation of the appeal to expert opinion. In the 
current experiments, we directly elicited degrees of belief for trustworthiness and expertise of 
a particular individual. To fully extend the network, it might be necessary to model these 
characteristics as distributions. Shafto et al. (2012), for example, fit parameters of ‘balance’ 
(how helpful/knowledgable people are perceived to be in general) and ‘uniformity’ (degree to 
which people are assumed to differ in their helpfulness/knowledge) to define a beta 
distribution for these characteristics.   
 Walton’s (1997, 2008b) account of the appeal to expert opinion is explicitly 
dialectical in nature. Consequently, the critical questions represented in Table 1 are intended 
to be exactly that, questions. The Bayesian approach provides a formalisation that 
demonstrates how the answers to these questions are important. The questioning will enable 
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recipients of the appeal to expert opinion to gather the knowledge that is necessary for them 
to evaluate the convincingness of the argument – an evaluation process whose key 
components appear to be conceptualisable within a Bayesian account. This is important, 
because the issue of how critical questions could be formalized in a way that makes them 
amenable to treatment in a computational system has been of long-standing interest (see, e.g., 
Verheij, 2003a,b; Walton & Gordon, 2005; Walton et al., 2008, chapters 11 and 12). 
Typically, approaches to this problem have sought to develop defeasible generalizations of 
classical logic. Questions and counter-questions are then conceptualised as ‘attacks’ that 
mean a particular premise can no longer be used (either by shifting the ‘burden of proof’, or 
via some notion of ‘defeat’). Two fundamental problems for such approaches are the fact that 
argument quality itself would seem to matter in determining whether or not a claim is 
defeated or a burden of proof shifted (on the burden of proof in this context more generally, 
see Hahn & Oaksford, 2007b): for example, an entirely irrelevant proposition, advanced as a 
counter-claim, should neither be sufficient to defeat a claim nor to bring about a shift in the 
burden of proof. This means some independent means of evaluating the content of the 
proposition and its strength as an argument is still required (see also Hahn & Oaksford, 
2007a). Secondly, the point has been made that critical questions, in particular further sub-
questions, might, in principle be able to proceed indefinitely (see e.g., Walton et al., 2008, 
chapter 11 on this point).  
 The Bayesian framework deals naturally with both of these concerns. It  provides a 
generalization of classical logic in the sense that propositional inference is a limit case. 
However, as an intensional calculus (see e.g., Pearl, 1988) it deals naturally with argument 
content. It is the specific content of premises and claims that determines the probabilistic 
relations, and hence inferential relationships, between them. Thus the framework captures 
naturally not only relevance relationships, but also the summary consequences on degree of 
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belief of amalgamating multiple pieces of evidence of varying strength, whether these be 
conflicting or mutually supporting (see also Hahn et al., 2012). Concerning the question of 
the possibility of ever further questions, finally, the Bayesian framework is helpful because, 
although it does not tackle fully the problem of never-ending exceptions (such exceptions 
will never be fully enumerated and hence explicitly modelled) it allows one to nevertheless 
reason in the face of such exceptions because probabilities summarise uncertainty, and thus 
can also summarise expectations of the possibility of relevant exceptions (see Pearl, 1988, 
chapter 1, for discussion of this point). Using the Bayesian framework to formalise schemes 
and critical questions thus allows one to address key challenges for formalization that the 
literature on schemes has previously identified.  
At the same time, however, this is not to reject dialectical considerations in the 
context of the appeal to expert opinion, or informal argument more generally. For one, as the 
pragma-dialectic approach to argumentation has sought to identify, there are rules for a 
dialogical argumentative exchange that are most conducive to the resolution of a difference 
of opinion in a critical discussion (e.g., Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). A central tenet 
of this approach is that both parties in an argumentation exchange should be able to advance 
arguments, and the greater authority of one over another should not stand in the way of the 
truth-finding objective. Walton (1995; see also, Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004) defines 
a fallacy as being an argument that interferes with the proper goal of the dialogue being 
engaged in – in this case the rational truth-finding goal of the critical discussion. Walton 
(1997, 2008b) therefore proposes not to label all weak instances of the appeal to expert 
opinion (as could be identified via the present Bayesian Network approach) as argument 
fallacies. Rather, the term fallacy (and thus the identification of the textbook fallacy of ad 
verecundiam) should be reserved for situations in which an appeal to expert opinion is used 
in a way that prevents the argument opponent from pursuing a line of critical questioning. 
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Walton argues that appealing to an expert’s opinion typically constitutes the ad Verecundiam 
fallacy when the critical questioning of the argumentation opponent is suppressed by the 
proponent of the appeal. In these instances, the appeal to expert opinion is a “decisive 
blocking or shutting-down type of move in argumentation that blocks off the respondent’s 
ability to raise any further questions or meaningfully or effectively take part in attempting to 
support his side of the issue any further in the dialogue” (Walton, 2008b, p. 61). The effect of 
the argument when used in this way is perhaps understood in terms of its proponent following 
it up with the statement, ‘Well, who are you to have an opinion? You’re no expert are you?’ 
(see also, Walton, 2008b), and thus the silencing of the opponent is complete. 
 It is difficult to see what the Bayesian Network formalisation laid out in Figs. 1 and 2 
can have to say in this regard. We prefer to see the probabilistic Bayesian approach and the 
pragmatic, dialectical approach as addressing two different important questions pertaining to 
the evaluation of the appeal to expert opinion and, indeed, argumentation more generally (see 
also, Hahn & Oaksford, 2006, 2007a,b). Dialectical rules are important for ensuring that the 
maximum relevant information possible is present within a critical discussion. Without such 
rules, the usefulness of argumentation in arriving at good conclusions is greatly 
compromised. Argument content, however, seems best evaluated through the formalisation of 
the relationships between propositions as provided by the well-established norms of 
probability theory, and hence the Bayesian approach to argumentation.   
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Footnotes 
1
 We are working with the assumption that the general practitioner has my best interests at 
heart. 
 
2
 If the opinions of other sources are sought rather than known a priori, then they are, 
technically speaking, not part of the prior belief. According to our model (Fig. 1), the effect 
on the evaluation of the argument will, however, be the same. 
 
3
 Šorm (2010) also maintains that the grounding of the expert’s testimony in evidence should 
be considered a sub-criterion of the expertise and trustworthiness criteria. 
 
4
 Of course, in general, an expert may also simply not speak to an issue. There is then no 
expert opinion to appeal to. This case, too, may inferentially be of interest as an argument 
from ignorance (see e.g., Hahn & Oaksford, 2007a; Harris, Corner & Hahn, 2013). Inclusion 
of this third option (‘a ‘non-response’) demands three possibilities for the evidence: positive 
evidence, negative evidence, and ‘non response’. Appropriate formalisations of this are 
presented, for example, in Hahn & Oaksford (2007a). Functionally, the inclusion of a third 
alternative, ‘non-response’ leaves unaffected inferences that are drawn from positive 
evidence (as can be verified by consulting the equations in Hahn & Oaksford, 2008, pg 131). 
The strength of these inferences is determined only by the relative probability of obtaining 
the positive evidence if the hypothesis were true, as opposed to if it were false (and likewise 
for explicit negative evidence where the expert says ‘no’). Moreover, it is only the ratio 
between these probabilities that matters, not their absolute values. Whether the possibility of 
a ‘non-response’ is included or not thus makes no difference to any of the cases examined in 
our paper.  
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5
 Note that there is also empirical evidence that people do treat expertise and trustworthiness 
independently (e.g., O’Hara et al., 1991; Wiener & Mowen, 1986). 
 
6
 The fact that the links in a Bayesian Network (e.g,. Fig. 2) have a clear, understandable 
interpretation as conditional probability relationships makes the parameterisation of a 
Bayesian model more natural than the parameterisation of, for example, a Markov Random 
Field Model, such as proposed in Butterfield, Jenkins, Sobel and Schwertfeger (2009) to 
model children’s trust in testimony. This makes the relation between the model and the 
behavior to be modelled more transparent. It also means that the probabilities necessary for 
parameterisation can be elicited in a number of ways. Note also that Butterfield et al. (2009) 
did not allow for a variation in trustworthiness, stating that “we are concerned with 
collaboration between agents acting cooperatively, there is no reason for agents to deceive 
each other…” (p. 43). 
 
7
The collected data for both experiments are included in the online supplementary materials. 
 
8
Although not all studies have reported a significant effect of manipulating the expertise of 
the authority (e.g., Hoeken, Timmers & Schellens, 2012), in Hoeken et al.’s study the 
expertise manipulation was much more subtle than that here, with a freshman studying 
nutrition still likely to be perceived as a source of some expertise on the subject of nutrition – 
in a way that a musician would not be perceived as an expert on a medical matter in the 
present experiment. 
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9
 If certainty ratings are not excluded, the same interaction remains significant, F(2, 81) = 
3.87, p = .025, and the 3-way interaction between ‘predicted/observed’, ‘trustworthiness’ and 
‘others’ opinions’ was also significant, F(2, 81) = 4.48, p = .014. 
 
10
If certainty ratings are not excluded, the same interactions remain significant: 
‘predicted/observed’ x ‘others’ opinions’, F(2, 81) = 8.04, p = .001; ‘predicted/observed’ x 
‘expertise’ x ‘others’ opinions’, F(2, 81) = 4.48, p = .014. In addition, there is also a 
significant ‘observed/predicted’ x ‘expertise’ interaction, F(1, 81) = 12.26, p = .001. 
 
11
This result was the same when certainty ratings were not excluded (all ps > .17). 
 
12
 An alternative approach would have been to elicit the prior solely in the absence of any 
other information (as in the ‘no mention of others’ condition), and capture the effect of other 
experts by eliciting participants’ subjective conditional probabilities of the relationship 
between H and Hrep (from S1) and Hrep (from S2)… (see Fig. 1). We chose the current 
approach to reduce the load on participants, and in line with the reasoning of Footnote 2. 
 
13
The pattern of results is unchanged if certainty ratings are not excluded. The 3-way 
interaction between ‘predicted/observed’, ‘trust’ and ‘others’ opinions’ again approached 
significance (p < .06) (all other ps > .135). 
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Table 1. Six key criteria for the appeal to expert opinion (Walton, 1997, p. 223; Walton, 2008b, p. 
218) 
Expertise Question: How credible is the source as an expert source? 
Field Question: Is the source an expert in the field that the issue concerns? 
Opinion Question: What did the source assert that implies the conclusion? 
Trustworthiness Question: Is the source a personally reliable source? 
Consistency Question: Is the conclusion consistent with what other expert sources 
assert? 
Backup Evidence Question: Is the source’s assertion based on evidence? 
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Table 2. The conditional probability table assumed for Figure 2. 
 
 HYPOTHESIS = “TRUE” (H) HYPOTHESIS =”FALSE” (¬H) 
 TRUSTWORTHY (T) NOT TRUSTWORTHY 
(¬T) 
TRUSTWORTHY 
(T) 
NOT 
TRUSTWORTHY (¬T) 
 EXPERT 
(E) 
NOT 
EXPERT 
(¬E) 
EXPERT (E) NOT 
EXPERT 
(¬E) 
EXPERT 
(E) 
NOT 
EXPERT 
(¬E) 
EXPERT 
(E) 
NOT 
EXPERT 
(¬E) 
REPORT 
=’YES’ 
1 .5 0 .5 0 .5 1 .5 
REPORT 
= ‘NO’ 
0 .5 1 .5 1 .5 0 .5 
 
Note. The values represent the conditional P(Rep) – where P(Rep) corresponds to a report of 
‘yes’ and P(¬Rep) corresponds to a report of ‘no.’ Thus, for example, the value ‘1’ in the top-
left cell of the table shows that P(Rep|H,T,Exp) = 1. 
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Table 3. Mean convincingness of the dialogue across the different experimental conditions in 
the two experiments.. 
others expertise trust 
Mean   Std. Error 
Expt. 1 Expt. 2   Expt. 1 Expt. 2 
disagree 
Musician 
Enemy 24.96 26.50 
 
4.83 6.64 
Friend 22.57 30.83   4.20 5.92 
Doctor 
Enemy 31.36 28.33 
 
5.32 7.43 
Friend 32.68 35.78   4.15 7.08 
no 
mention 
Musician 
Enemy 37.82 39.75 
 
4.83 4.94 
Friend 45.25 50.05   4.20 4.52 
Doctor 
Enemy 51.14 46.05 
 
5.32 5.51 
Friend 72.11 67.30   4.15 6.17 
agree 
Musician 
Enemy 53.04 61.74 
 
4.83 4.26 
Friend 65.50 70.37   4.20 3.63 
Doctor 
Enemy 64.21 65.89 
 
5.32 5.22 
Friend 74.32 80.89   4.15 3.64 
 
Running head: APPEAL TO EXPERT OPINION  1 
 
Table 4. Mean parameter values elicited from participants before exposure to the argumentation dialogue (standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
      Expt. 1       Expt. 2 
Others Expertise Trust P(Exp)   P(T)       P(Exp)   P(T)   P(H) 
Disagree Musician Enemy 19.96 (18.66) 
 
38.14 (19.13) 
   
33.11 (23.17) 
 
37.78 (23.13) 
 
19.56 (20.81) 
 
  Friend 27.79 (22.15)   80.39 (20.87)       33.22 (24.39)   77.78 (27.64)   19.56 (20.81) 
 
Doctor Enemy 68.43 (18.07) 
 
59.11 (28.28) 
   
68.72 (29.69) 
 
66.50 (27.65) 
 
19.56 (20.81) 
    Friend 68.25 (25.37)   88.14 (15.96)       76.22 (19.94)   91.11 (11.70)   19.56 (20.81) 
No  Musician Enemy 22.86 (18.80) 
 
55.29 (29.50) 
   
34.25 (25.99) 
 
39.15 (24.65) 
 
48.65 (15.86) 
mention   Friend 29.82 (21.61)   80.46 (20.94)       35.75 (24.66)   81.90 (21.54)   48.65 (15.86) 
 
Doctor Enemy 62.82 (28.41) 
 
61.82 (30.68) 
   
78.30 (23.34) 
 
59.85 (27.65) 
 
48.65 (15.86) 
    Friend 63.57 (29.14)   82.82 (25.46)       72.35 (23.33)   84.60 (18.34)   48.65 (15.86) 
Agree Musician Enemy 19.86 (17.51) 
 
46.50 (26.20) 
   
30.53 (25.58) 
 
60.26 (25.07) 
 
77.79 (13.77) 
              
 
  Friend 21.93 (23.87)   74.75 (27.50)       26.21 (24.29)   78.37 (20.61)   77.79 (13.77) 
 
Doctor Enemy 67.86 (24.58) 
 
69.00 (26.77) 
   
62.89 (27.43) 
 
71.16 (22.81) 
 
77.79 (13.77) 
    Friend 72.54 (20.85)   82.57 (20.09)       61.79 (28.97)   84.00 (16.80)   77.79 (13.77) 
 
Note: P(T) and P(Exp) were asked before the manipulation of P(H), so should not be affected. They are split by P(H) condition here for 
maximum transparency. 
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List of Figures 
Figure 1. The Bayesian network proposed as a formalisation of the appeal to expert opinion 
by Hahn et al. (2012). The expert source is represented by the letter S. S is the expert whose 
report is being used in the argument, whilst S2 and S3 refer to other experts, so as to address 
the consistency question in Table 1. 
 
Figure 2. A Bayesian Network including the two key factors for a probabilistic analysis of 
the appeal to expert opinion. 
 
Figure 3. An example argumentation dialogue, from the ‘no mention of others’, ‘low 
expertise’, ‘low trustworthiness’ condition. 
 
Figure 4. A schematic showing participants’ progression through the experiment. The 
bracketed numbers represent the number of questions answered at each point. Note that in the 
penultimate box, for each dialogue participants always answered P(H|Rep) first before, on a 
subsequent page, answering the other 2 questions (order counterbalanced across participants). 
The dashed box represents a stage that was only present in Experiment 2. 
 
Figure 5. The interaction between trustworthiness and others’ opinions in Experiment 1. 
Error bars are plus and minus 1 standard error. 
 
APPEAL TO EXPERT OPINION    60 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The fit between the Bayesian predictions and the observed convincingness ratings 
in Experiment 1. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 7. The fit between the Bayesian predictions and the observed convincingness ratings 
in Experiment 1 after removing predicted values of 1. Error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
Figure 8. The fit between the Bayesian predictions for posterior ratings of the expert’s 
expertise and the observed ratings in Experiment 1. Error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
Figure 9. The fit between the Bayesian predictions for posterior ratings of the expert’s 
trustworthiness and the observed ratings in Experiment 1. Error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
Figure 10. The fit between the Bayesian predictions and the observed convincingness ratings 
in Experiment 2. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 11. The fit between the Bayesian predictions for posterior ratings of the expert’s 
expertise and the observed ratings in Experiment 2. Error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
Figure 12. The fit between the Bayesian predictions for posterior ratings of the expert’s 
trustworthiness and the observed ratings in Experiment 2. Error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Figure 13. Including Qualifications as evidence of expertise in a Bayesian network of the 
appeal to expert opinion. 
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Figure 1.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Bayesian network proposed as a formalisation of the appeal to expert opinion 
by Hahn et al. (2012). The expert source is represented by the letter S. S is the expert whose 
report is being used in the argument, whilst S2 and S3 refer to other experts, so as to address 
the consistency question in Table 1.   
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Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A Bayesian Network including the two key factors for a probabilistic analysis of 
the appeal to expert opinion. 
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Figure 3. 
 
James: Do you think eating Proftanine lowers cholestrol? 
Anne: I have no idea if eating Proftanine lowers cholestrol. 
James: Well, I can tell you that eating Proftanine lowers cholestrol. 
Anne: Why do you say that? 
James: Keith told me that eating Proftanine lowers cholestrol 
Anne: Who’s Keith? 
James: Keith is an old enemy of mine who is also a musician.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. An example argumentation dialogue, from the ‘no mention of others’, ‘low 
expertise’, ‘low trustworthiness’ condition. 
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Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. A schematic showing participants’ progression through the experiment. The 
bracketed numbers represent the number of questions answered at each point. Note that in the 
penultimate box, for each dialogue participants always answered P(H|Rep) first before, on a 
subsequent page, answering the other 2 questions (order counterbalanced across participants). 
The dashed box represents a stage that was only present in Experiment 2. 
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Figure 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The interaction between trustworthiness and others’ opinions in Experiment 1. 
Error bars are plus and minus 1 standard error. 
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Figure 6. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The fit between the Bayesian predictions and the observed convincingness ratings 
in Experiment 1. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 7. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. The fit between the Bayesian predictions and the observed convincingness ratings 
in Experiment 1 after removing predicted values of 1. Error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8. The fit between the Bayesian predictions for posterior ratings of the expert’s 
expertise and the observed ratings in Experiment 1. Error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. The fit between the Bayesian predictions for posterior ratings of the expert’s 
trustworthiness and the observed ratings in Experiment 1. Error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10. The fit between the Bayesian predictions and the observed convincingness ratings 
in Experiment 2. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11. The fit between the Bayesian predictions for posterior ratings of the expert’s 
expertise and the observed ratings in Experiment 2. Error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12. The fit between the Bayesian predictions for posterior ratings of the expert’s 
trustworthiness and the observed ratings in Experiment 2. Error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13. Including Qualifications as evidence of expertise in a Bayesian network of the 
appeal to expert opinion. 
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List of Appendices 
 
Appendix 1. The equations behind the nested models used as a comparison in the results 
section of Experiment 2. 
 
Figure A1. Distributions of estimates of P(H) in Expt. 2 across the three ‘others’ opinions’ 
conditions. 
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Appendix 1 
 
In the model ignoring trustworthiness, P(Rep|H) and P(Rep|¬H) were obtained through 
marginalisation and with the conditional probability assignment laid out in Table 2, such that: 
 
P(Rep|H) = P(Rep|H,Exp)*P(Exp) + P(Rep|H,¬Exp)*P(¬Exp) 
P(Rep|H) = 1*P(Exp) + 0.5*P(¬Exp) 
 
P(Rep|¬H) = P(Rep|¬H,Exp)*P(Exp) + P(Rep|¬H,¬Exp)*P(¬Exp) 
P(Rep|H) = 0*P(Exp) + 0.5*P(¬Exp) 
 
For the model ignoring expertise: 
 
P(Rep|H) = P(Rep|H,T)*P(T) + P(Rep|H,¬T)*P(¬T) 
P(Rep|H) = 1*P(T) + 0*P(¬T) 
P(Rep|H) = P(T) 
 
P(Rep|¬H) = P(Rep|¬H,T)*P(T) + P(Rep|¬H,¬T)*P(¬T) 
P(Rep|¬H) = 0*P(T) + 1*P(¬T) 
P(Rep|H) = P(¬T) 
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Figure A1 
 
 
 
Figure A1. Distributions of estimates of P(H) in Expt. 2 across the three ‘others’ opinions’ 
conditions. 
 
